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Abstract
Background: Alexithymia, or ‘‘no words for feelings’’, is a personality trait which is associated with difficulties in emotion
recognition and regulation. It is unknown whether this deficit is due primarily to regulation, perception, or mentalizing of
emotions. In order to shed light on the core deficit, we tested our subjects on a wide range of emotional tasks. We expected
the high alexithymics to underperform on all tasks.
Method: Two groups of healthy individuals, high and low scoring on the cognitive component of the Bermond-Vorst
Alexithymia Questionnaire, completed questionnaires of emotion regulation and performed several emotion processing
tasks including a micro expression recognition task, recognition of emotional prosody and semantics in spoken sentences,
an emotional and identity learning task and a conflicting beliefs and emotions task (emotional mentalizing).
Results: The two groups differed on the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire, Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire and
Empathy Quotient. Specifically, the Emotion Regulation Quotient showed that alexithymic individuals used more
suppressive and less reappraisal strategies. On the behavioral tasks, as expected, alexithymics performed worse on
recognition of micro expressions and emotional mentalizing. Surprisingly, groups did not differ on tasks of emotional
semantics and prosody and associative emotional-learning.
Conclusion: Individuals scoring high on the cognitive component of alexithymia are more prone to suppressive emotion
regulation strategies rather than reappraisal strategies. Regarding emotional information processing, alexithymia is
associated with reduced performance on measures of early processing as well as higher order mentalizing. However,
difficulties in the processing of emotional language were not a core deficit in our alexithymic group.
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Introduction
Alexithymia, or ‘‘no words for feelings’’, is a personality trait
characterized by difficulties in emotion regulation, difficulties in
identifying, describing and communicating feelings, difficulties in
differentiating feelings from bodily sensations and diminished
affect-related fantasy [1,2]. Alexithymia has been reported to be a
risk factor for a variety of medical and psychiatric disorders like
substance use disorders, somatization, anxiety and depression [3],
and even schizophrenia [4]. Moreover, alexithymia reduces life
satisfaction [5]. In a large sample in the general Finnish
population, the prevalence rate of alexithymia was around 10%
[6]. Unraveling the psychological mechanisms underlying alex-
ithymia may have important clinical and societal implications.
Even though several studies have investigated the underlying
mechanisms of emotional processing in alexithymia, using a
variety of tasks [e.g. 7–11; for an overview see 12]; the results
remain equivocal. On a basic emotional-perceptual level of
processing, Suslow [10] found that the ‘difficulty describing
feelings’ score on the 20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-
20) [13] was correlated to a facilitation effect in a priming
paradigm for negative words, consistent with an enhanced
automatic processing of affective information. Contradictory to
these results, Vermeulen et al. [11] showed that individuals with
high scores on alexithymia are less prone to process emotional
information at an automatic level, as was investigated in a different
priming paradigm, in which negative and positive primes (resp.
angry and happy faces) were included. Only the presentation of
the angry face resulted in a lower priming effect for participants
with high alexithymia scores [11].
Lane and colleagues [7,8], however, reported that high
alexithymic individuals perform worse on recognizing all basic
emotions in an emotional perception task. This task consisted of
four subtasks in which pairs of sentences and words, faces and
words, sentences and faces and faces and photographs of scenes
had to be matched for emotion. In line with these findings one
would expect to see a lower priming effect of both happy and
angry faces in the priming paradigm from Vermeulen et al. [11].
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seems to be altered in alexithymia but the results are inconsistent.
On a cognitive-emotional level in which cognition plays a more
prominent role, such as memory for emotions or learning
associations between emotions and words, Luminet et al. [9]
compared people with high versus low alexithymia levels on a
memory task in which participants had to recall emotional and
neutralwords.Theyhadtoindicateiftheyonly‘knew’thattheyhad
seen the word in the list, i.e. without retrieval of any details or that
they ‘remembered’ the word with details, for example, the position
of the word in the list. Alexithymics gave less ‘remember’ responses
for emotional words but responded the same for neutral words.
Groups did not differ in ‘know’ responses for emotional and neutral
words. Thus, it appears that cognitive-emotional processing differs
between individuals with high and low alexithymia scores.
Mentalizing, a cognitive skill also known as theory of mind
(TOM), refers to understanding that others have beliefs, desires
and intentions different from the self [14]. Mentalizing is impaired
in psychiatric disorders which are associated with alexithymia like
schizophrenia [4,15] and Asperger’s syndrome [16]. Healthy
people with high alexithymia scores are also impaired in
mentalizing and show reduced brain activation of medial frontal
areas during mentalizing [17]. The latter study examined the
participants’ ability to infer what other people think but not what
they feel. This latter ability, emotional mentalizing, has not been
studied but we expect it to be impaired in alexithymia.
Each of the studies mentioned above focused on one stage of
information processing in alexithymic individuals: basic-emotion-
al, cognitive-emotional and mentalizing. It seems that high and
low alexithymics differ on all three stages of emotional information
processing but results are ambiguous. This ambiguity could be due
to the participation of subjects from different populations and the
use of different inclusion criteria in the aforementioned studies.
The main purpose of the present study was to investigate
differences in stages of emotional processing in individuals with
high versus low verbalizing scores on the Bermond-Vorst
Alexithymia Questionnaire (BVAQ) [18]. Both auditory-verbal
and visual modalities at different levels of emotional processing
were investigated. We included measures of early perception of
facial emotional expressions, and recognition of emotional
prosody. In addition, we included tasks with stronger cognitive
demands. Aleman [19] proposed that learning to verbalize
emotions requires development of an association between
particular affective states and particular words and that alex-
ithymics are less able to make these associations. Therefore, we
included a task in which subjects learned associations between
words and emotional facial expressions. Additionally, to investi-
gate whether alexithymia is a deficit of emotional awareness in
general (independent of modality) or whether it is more
pronounced for language-related processes, we included tasks
with emotional linguistic stimuli. Moreover, because deficits in
thinking about and interpreting emotions is central to alexithymia,
we included an emotional mentalizing task to probe the meta-
cognitive level. To the best of our knowledge, no studies have been
reported yet on emotional mentalizing abilities in alexithymics. We
expected an inverse relationship between alexithymia and
emotional mentalizing capacity.
In addition, to shed light on behavioral emotional processing,
we aimed to clarify differences in emotion regulation strategies, as
described by Gross & John [20]. To this end, we included
questionnaires measuring reappraisal, suppression and expressiv-
ity. We were primarily interested in the aspect of ‘‘no words for
feelings’’ to examine if alexithymia is related to language-related
processes. Therefore, we initially selected participants based on
extreme scores on the verbalizing subscale of an alexithymia
questionnaire, which specifically assesses the difficulty in verbal-
izing one’s feelings. We anticipated that subjects with high scores
on the verbalizing scale would also have higher scores on the other
scales of the alexithymia questionnaire.
Methods
Participants
A total of 493 university students filled in the verbalizing scale of
the Bermond Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire (BVAQ) [18].
Nineteen individuals with score#17 and 24 with score$26 and
who gave permission to be contacted for further research, were
initially selected for this study. These cutoff values were chosen to
generate subgroups roughly corresponding to the lowest and
highest quartiles. Participants filled in the complete BVAQ when
they came for the experiment. At this time, the participants from
the low alexithymia group were excluded if they scored above the
overall mean verbalizing score of the 493 students (score.20.97).
To ensure that the high alexithymia group was robust, reliable and
reproducible, we only included participants in the high group if
they still scored$26. Additionally, the mean of the high group had
to be more than 1.5 SD (score.29.73) above the overall mean of
the verbalizing scale. After this second selection, we included
eighteen participants in the low alexithymia group (eleven females,
mean age 19.3 years, SD 1.0) and sixteen in the high (nine females,
mean age 20.1 years, SD 1.7). Due to the more stringent inclusion
criteria for the high group, more individuals had to be excluded
from this group.
Groups differed significantly on the second measurement of the
verbalizing scale (F(1,32)=174.89, p,0.001).
The study was approved by the Ethics Committee Psychology of
the University of Groningen. All participants gave their written
informed consent. Participants were paid J 12 for participation.
Questionnaires
Bermond-Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire. The BVAQ
is a 40-item self-report scale, which is subdivided into 5 scales (8
items per scale), comprising the alexithymia features as defined by
Nemiah and Sifneos [21] and Sifneos [1], namely verbalizing,
analyzing, identifying, emotionalizing and fantasizing. Previous
studies have shown that the BVAQ has good psychometric
properties and that the 5-factor structure of the BVAQ is
supported by factor-analyses [18,22–24]. Answers are scored on
a 5-point scale (1=certainly does not apply to me, up to
5=certainly applies to me). Higher scores indicate more
alexithymic. Participants were selected on the verbalizing scale
of the Bermond-Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire (BVAQ) [18].
An example of the verbalizing scale is ‘‘I find it difficult to verbally
express my feelings’’. At the time of testing, they were also asked to
fill in the complete BVAQ. Bermond and colleagues have made a
second order distinction, in which they distinguish a cognitive
component, which comprises the verbalizing, analyzing and
identifying subscales, and an affective component, consisting of
the emotionalizing and fantasizing subscales. This two-factor
structure has been validated in six languages and seven
populations [25]. The correlation between the cognitive
component of the BVAQ and the Toronto Alexithymia Scale
(TAS-20) [13], which also targets the cognitive component of
alexithymia, is high (r=0.80) [18].
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire. Emotion regulation
was measured with the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ)
[20]. This scale measures two emotion regulation strategies:
cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression. Cognitive
Alexithymia and Emotion
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potentially emotion-eliciting situation into a situation with a
different emotional impact [26]. Expressive suppression is a way of
response modulation involving inhibition of emotion-expressive
behavior [27]. Examples of this questionnaire are ‘‘I control my
emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I’m in’’
(reappraisal), ‘‘I control my emotions by not expressing them’’
(suppression). The scale consists of 10 items (6 reappraisal items, 4
suppression items). Lower reappraisal and higher suppression
scores indicate more problems with emotion regulation.
Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire. Emotional
expressivity was measured with the Berkeley Expressivity
Questionnaire (BEQ) . This questionnaire assesses three facets of
emotional expressivity: negative expressivity (NE) (6 items),
positive expressivity (PE) (4 items), and impulse strength (IS) (6
items). The questionnaire measures the degree to which both
positive and negative emotions are expressed behaviorally and also
the general strength of the emotional impulses. Examples of items
are ‘‘It is difficult for me to hide my fear’’ (NE), ‘‘When I’m happy,
my feelings show’’ (PE), ‘‘My body reacts very strongly to
emotional situations’’ (IS) [28]. Items can be rated on a scale
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Higher
scores indicate higher degrees to which emotion response
tendencies are expressed as manifest behavior and a higher
general strength of these tendencies.
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule. Positive and
negative affect were measured with the Positive Affect Negative
Affect Schedule (PANAS). The PANAS measures the current
affective state. Positive affect (PA) reflects the extent to which a
person feels enthusiastic, active and alert (examples: ‘‘interested’’
and ‘‘excited’’). Negative Affect (NA) is a general dimension of
distress, two items of this subscale are ‘‘nervous’’ and ‘‘upset’’ [29].
This scale consists of 10 positive affect items and 10 negative affect
items. Higher scores indicate stronger affect (either positive or
negative).
Empathy Quotient. Empathy was measured with the
Empathy Quotient (EQ) [30]. This questionnaire measures the
ability to what extent one is able to tune into how someone else is
feeling, or what someone else might be thinking. An example of an
item is ‘‘I am good at predicting how someone will feel.’’ This scale
comprises 60 items, including 20 filler items. A high score means a
high degree of empathy.
Tasks
Micro Expression Training Tool. In the Micro Expression
Training Tool (METT) [31] participants had to learn to recognize
micro expressions in faces. Micro-expressions are very brief
(15 ms) facial expressions, beginning and ending with a neutral
expression. In this task seven different emotions were shown:
sadness, anger, surprise, fear, disgust, contempt and happiness.
The participant was first trained and then allowed to practice to
learn to recognize micro-expressions of emotions. The training
consisted of four pairs of faces expressing commonly confused
emotions (anger/disgust, contempt/happy, fear/surprise, fear/
sadness). Each trial started with two neutral faces, which
simultaneously transformed in slow motion (4 s) into two
commonly confused emotions. In each trial, the faces
transformed four times from neutral to the emotional
expressions and back to neutral, ending in an emotional
expression. The spoken information about the expressions from
the Ekman software [31] was not presented. In the practice session
(42 trials), a micro-expression was presented and the participant
had to select the corresponding emotion out of seven emotions.
Feedback was given after each response. Finally, a test of micro-
expression recognition was performed consisting of 14 trials (two
trials per emotion), similar to the practice session but without
feedback. Accuracy scores of the recognition test were used for
statistical analysis. Due to technical problems, data were not
available for one subject.
Associative Learning Task. Two associative learning tasks
were administered (using E-prime software [32]). The tasks were
based on the tasks described by Exner et al. [33]. Both tasks
consisted of six pictures of basic facial emotional expressions from
the Ekman and Friesen series [34] and six words. One of the tasks
concerned identity and the other emotion. In the identity learning
trials, six words (hat, scissors, carpet, basket, table, stone) paired
with neutral expressions from different people (three male and
three female faces) were shown for a maximum of 30 seconds
each. Participants were instructed to memorize each pair. In the
recall trial, that immediately followed the learning trial,
participants had to match the correct face out of the six faces to
each word subsequently. This sequence was presented six times in
random order amounting to 36 trials. After the participant recalled
all six pairs correctly or after six learning and recall trials, the task
was terminated. The emotional learning task was the same as the
identity learning task except for the pictures of the faces and the
words (car, newspaper, paper, bag, football, and chair). In this
task, the face showed the six basic emotional expressions (anger,
fear, disgust, sadness, happiness and surprise) of one woman. In
the recall trial, the participant had to match the correct emotional
expression to each word. The number of correct pairs was used for
statistical analysis.
Affective Prosody Task. Participants were asked to identify
the emotion expressed through the prosody or semantics of a
spoken sentence. This task consisted of sentences with an
emotional content (happy, sad, angry, anxious) pronounced with
an incongruent emotional tone of voice (happy, sad, angry,
anxious). The sentences were pronounced by two professional
actors, a male and a female voice, to control for individual and/or
gender differences in affective prosody [35]. The sentences were of
approximately equal length and were presented via two speakers
by a computer at a rate of one sentence per 20 seconds. During
listening, the emotion labels from which the participant could
choose (fear, anger, happiness and sadness) were presented on the
computer screen. In the prosody condition, participants had to
attend to the affective tone of voice and ignore the incongruent
affective semantic content. In the semantics condition, participants
had to attend to the affective semantic content and ignore the
affective tone of voice. Participants were instructed to make a
response as soon as they identified the emotion expressed in the
sentence, either based on content or tone of voice (‘prosody’) [35].
Accuracy and reaction times were used for statistical analysis. Due
to a lack of correct responses in one condition, four participants
were not included in this analysis.
Conflicting Beliefs and Emotions. We employed a Dutch
translation of the task designed by Shaw and colleagues [36] to
measure cognitive and emotional aspects of ‘theory of mind’. It
consisted of eight vignettes, each concerning a short story
involving a social situation of either exclusion or threat. Each
story features two actors, A and B; A holds a true first order belief
and B holds a false second order belief. Each belief is associated
with an emotional state, one with positive and the other with
negative valence. Each story was followed by six questions aimed
at testing participants’ understanding of the conflicting beliefs and
the associated emotional states. Two first-order and two second-
order questions were included. The first-order questions tested
participants’ ability to deduce from the story the belief and
emotional state of actor A. The second order questions tested
Alexithymia and Emotion
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thoughts of actor A as well as the by actor B perceived associated
emotional state of actor A. Two control questions were included to
test recall of the story and the making of inferences. Two blind
raters scored the task independently and assigned 0 for a wrong
response, 1 for a partially correct response and 2 for a correct
response.
Statistical Analyses
Statistical analyses were performed using Statistical Packages for
the Social Sciences 14.0 [37]. All analyses were performed two
sided. The alexithymic and non-alexithymic groups were com-
pared on their verbalizing score with an independent t-test. Data
from the BVAQ, ERQ, BEQ and EQ were analyzed with a
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with the subscales of
the questionnaires as dependent variables and Group as
independent variable. The effect of alexithymia on the positive
and negative affect scales were analyzed with an analysis of
variance (ANOVA). Correlations between subscales of all
questionnaires were analyzed by Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficients.
Differences between groups on reaction times (only correct
trials) and accuracy scores of the associative learning task (identity
and emotional learning) were both analyzed with analysis of
variance (ANOVA).
Task performance on the semantic subtask and prosody subtask
of the affective prosody task were analyzed with two MANOVAs
with reaction times per emotion as dependent variables. Accuracy
scores of this task were analyzed in the same way.
Accuracy scores on the METT task were compared with
ANOVA.
The Conflicting Beliefs and Emotions vignettes were tested with
a Kruskal-Wallis test with the separate mean scores on the
vignettes as dependent variables.
Results
Questionnaires
MANOVA revealed a significant group effect on BVAQ, ERQ,
BEQ and EQ scores (F(12,21)=13.24, p,0.001). See Table 1 for
descriptive statistics and group effects.
Alexithymia Questionnaire (BVAQ). The alexithymic
group not only scored higher on verbalizing (F(1,32)=174.89,
p,0.001), but also on identifying (F(1,32)=7.98, p=0.008) and
analyzing (F(1,32)=15.97, p,0.001). However, there were no
group differences on the emotionalizing (p=0.28) and fantasizing
(p=0.28) scales. We have to mention that the alexithymic group
scored high on the cognitive component of the questionnaire but
not on the emotionalizing component. Notably, the cognitive
component of the BVAQ correlates highly with the TAS-20. This
implies comparability between our sample and samples selected
using the TAS-20 questionnaire.
The verbalizing subscale of the BVAQ was positively correlated
with the ERQ subscales reappraisal (r=0.46, p=0.006) and
suppression (r=0.82, p,0.001), and negatively correlated with the
BEQ positive expressivity (r=20.73, p,0.001), BEQ negative
expressivity (r=20.67, p,0.001), BEQ impulse strength
(r=20.46, p=0.007) and EQ empathy scale (p=0.04).
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire. The high alexithymic
group scored lower on the reappraisal (F(1,32)=6.85 p=0.013)
and higher on the suppression scale of the ERQ (F(1,32)=33.42,
p,0.001).
Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire. The high
alexithymic group had lower ratings on the positive
(F(1,32)=24.42, p,0.001) and negative (F(1,32)=14.43,
p=0.001) expressivity and impulse strength (F(1,32)=7.56,
p=0.01) dimensions of the BEQ.
Empathy Quotient. The high alexithymia group scored
(significantly) lower on the empathy scale (F(1,32)=7.31, p=0.01)
but did not differ on the control items (F(1,32)=0.86, p=0.36).
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule. Groups did not
differ on the positive (F(1,32)=0.17, p=0.68) and negative affect
schedule (F(1,32)=2.60, p=0.12).
Tasks
Micro Expression Training Tool. Alexithymic participants
scored significantly lower on recognizing brief emotional
expressions (see Table 2) (F(1,31)=9.60, p=0.004).
Associative Learning Task. The groups did not differ on
their performance on the associative learning task. This was the
case for both emotional learning (F(1,32)=0.90, p=0.35), and
identity learning (F(1,32)=0.99, p=0.33) (see Table 2).
Affective Prosody Task. The affective prosody task revealed
no differences between groups, not on accuracy in the prosody task
(F(4,29)=1.77, p=0.16) and not on accuracy in the semantics task
(F(4,29=0.32, p=0.86). Groups also showed no differences in
reaction times, neither in the prosody task (F(4,25)=0.59, p=0.68)
nor in the semantics task, although there was a trend for
alexithymic individuals to react slower in the latter (see Table 2)
(F(4,29)=2.44, p=0.07).
Conflicting Beliefs and Emotions task. The high
alexithymic group performed significantly worse on the first
order emotion question of the conflicting beliefs and emotions
Table 1. Mean scores (S.D.) on questionnaires for the





Verbalizing 32.44 (4.46) 13.83 (3.75) 174.89 0.001**
Analyzing 20.88 (5.80) 13.78 (4.54) 15.97 0.001**
Identifying 18.75 (4.88) 14.44 (4.00) 7.98 0.008*
Emotionalizing 21.94 (6.39) 19.67 (5.74) 1.19 0.28
Fantasizing 23.13 (5.40) 20.50 (7.96) 1.23 0.28
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ)
Reappraisal 25.63 (5.12) 30.22 (5.11) 6.85 0.01*
Suppression 17.06 (3.00) 10.39 (3.65) 33.42 0.001**
Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire (BEQ)
Total Positive
Expressivity
17.69 (2.41) 22.83 (3.49) 24.42 0.001**
Total Negative
Expressivity
18.69 (3.28) 25.33 (6.27) 14.43 0.001**
Total Impulse strength 21.31 (5.51) 27.56 (7.45) 7.56 0.01*
Emotion Quotient (EQ)
Empathy scale 34.19 (14.47) 45.67 (10.13) 7.31 0.01*
Control items 11.31 (2.52) 12.39 (3.99) 0.86 0.36
Positive and Negative Affective Scale (PANAS)
positive affect 29.63 (5.21) 30.44 (6.22) 0.17 0.68
negative affect 13.30 (3.79) 11.78 (2.34) 2.60 0.12
*significant at p,0.01 level (two-sided).
**significant at p,0.001 level (two-sided).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005751.t001
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2=9.46, p=0.002). There was no difference in
performance on the first (x
2=2.72, p=0.10) and second order
cognition (x
2=2.17, p=1.14) nor on second order emotion
(x
2=1.12, p=0.29). In addition, no group difference existed on
the control questions (x
2=0.25, p=0.87) (see Table 2). The inter
rater reliability was high (r=0.77).
Discussion
In this study, we observed that healthy participants with
relatively high levels of alexithymia used less efficient emotion
regulation strategies (i.e. more suppression, less reappraisal). They
also reported less expressivity and lower impulse strength. With
regard to cognitive-emotional processing, the alexithymic individ-
uals were impaired at rapid recognition of emotional information
from faces and, on a higher level of processing, at emotional
mentalizing. Surprisingly, there were no specific deficits in
processing of emotional language. None of these group differences
was attributable to mood differences (on which groups did not
differ). Participants scored high on the cognitive factor of
alexithymia and relatively normal on the emotionalizing factor.
With regard to the self report questionnaires, previous studies
on emotion regulation in alexithymia have thus far focused on
suppressive and repressive [8,38] strategies. Suppression, as
measured by the Illness Behaviour Questionnaire [39], correlates
positively with two subscales of the TAS-20: difficulty expressing
feelings to others and externally oriented thinking [40]. To our
knowledge, our study is the first to investigate reappraisal as an
additional emotion regulation strategy to suppression, as outlined
in the influential model by Gross and John [20]. Alexithymic
individuals had lower reappraisal scores and higher suppression
scores on the emotion regulation questionnaire. This pattern has
been associated with lower levels of well-being [20]. Because
reappraisal occurs early in the emotion regulation process, before
the emotion response tendencies have been fully generated, it can
determine the entire upcoming emotional trajectory [20]. Our
novel finding of the relationship between alexithymia and
difficulties with reappraisal, suggests that an enhanced focus on
reappraisal might be beneficial in the therapy of alexithymia.
The Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire can differentiate
between negative and positive emotion-expressive behavior and
has been shown to have substantial correspondence with peer
ratings [28]. The alexithymic group reported less behavioral
expressivity for both positive and negative emotions. Additionally,
their general strength of emotion response tendencies was weaker.
These findings are in agreement with increased employment of
suppressive emotion regulation strategies by the alexithymic group.
Furthermore, the alexithymic group reported lower levels of
empathy. This corroborates and extends previous research
investigating empathy and alexithymia: Guttman and Laporte
[41] reported lower empathy, measured with the interpersonal
reactivity index – IRI [42], in alexithymic participants, defined by
the TAS-20. Alexithymic individuals scored lower on the subscales
perspective taking, empathic concern and scored higher on
personal distress. The same pattern was demonstrated in
alexithymic students [17]. Our study demonstrated the same
inverse relationship in healthy alexithymic individuals, but using
other measures of alexithymia and empathy. The basis for this
correlation may be that feeling empathy for another person
requires understanding of the other’s feeling which may in turn
rely on knowing one’s own feeling. This concept would imply that
alexithymia undermines empathy (but a lack of empathy should
not necessarily lead to alexithymia).
The behavioral emotional processing tasks extended the
questionnaire findings from self to others. Questionnaires showed
maladaptive processing of own emotions, while behavioral tasks
showed that processing and recognizing of others’ emotions was
also, quite specifically, impaired. This was evident from both the
METT and the conflicting beliefs and emotion task.
On the higher order emotion-processing task, the conflicting beliefs
and emotions task, participants in the high alexithymic group
displayed poor understanding of the first order emotional state.
This can be explained by the ‘blindfeel’ hypothesis: alexithymia is
characterized by a deficit in interoceptive awareness despite the
fact that behavioral and autonomic reactivity are present.
Alexithymics either feel nothing or do not recognize the feeling
[43]. Similar to the case for empathy, knowing another person’s
feeling probably requires awareness of one’s own feelings.
Table 2. Mean scores (%) (S.D.) on the cognitive-emotional tasks for the high and low alexithymic groups.
Alexithymic Non-Alexithymic F x
2 P
Emotional learning 79.7 (18.8) 84.9 (13.0) 0.90 0.35
Identity learning 88.7 (9.5) 92.1 (10.4) 0.99 0.33
METT 74.2 (16.6) 88.8 (9.8) 9.60 0.004*
Affective Prosody Task
Prosody Accuracy 73.2 (13.9) 77.1 (12.5) 1.77 0.16
Prosody Reaction Time (ms) 4040.4 (640.7) 3875.9 (728.3) 0.59 0.68
Semantic Accuracy 87.5 (7.6) 88.4 (8.4) 0.32 0.86
Semantic Reaction Time (ms) 4519.1 (329.2) 4491.8 (522,5) 2.44 0.07
Conflicting Beliefs and emotions
1
st order cognition 93.8 (9.1) 98.6 (3.4) 2.72 0.10
2
st order cognition 95.3 (7.7) 98.6 (4.0) 2.17 1.14
1
st order emotion 85.2 (9.9) 95.1 (8.7) 9.46 0.002*
2
nd order emotion 75.4 (15.4) 78.5 (24.2) 1.12 0.29
Control questions 97.3 (4.4) 98.1 (2.7) 0.25 0.87
*significant at p,0.005 level (2-tailed).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005751.t002
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about the conflicting belief. The same applied to the second order
conflicting belief and the associated emotional state, but these
latter questions were very difficult to interpret which may explain
the lack of a difference. Both groups scored equally well on the
control questions, which confirms that there was no difference in
understanding of the story. Consistent with findings of Wastell and
Taylor [44] who reported normal performance of alexithymic
individuals in a false belief task, our findings confirm that the high
alexithymic group was quite able to think about others in a
different situation. Our results extend this by showing that the
impairment is specific for emotions.
Interestingly, in a study employing the same task, patients with
early amygdala damage also made more errors in emotional
attributions [36]. As both patients with amygdala damage and
high alexithymic individuals fail to attribute the correct emotional
state to another person, it would be interesting to specifically
investigate the role of the amygdala in alexithymia. Subclinical
amygdala damage could be the neural basis for certain forms of
alexithymia.
To some extent this has already been investigated but without
confirming altered amygdala activation in alexithymia [17,45,46].
However, these studies did not specifically focus on the amygdala
or used relatively small subject groups [45,46] or did not
specifically look at emotion processing [17]. It therefore remains
an interesting possibility that subclinical amygdala damage could
be the neural basis for certain forms of alexithymia.
Alexithymic individuals were not only impaired on higher order
emotion processing but also on low level early processing of
emotions. Lane et al. [8], already demonstrated that highly
alexithymic participants have deficits in recognition of emotions.
We observed that, after a training session, alexithymic individuals
recognized micro-expressions less accurately than non-alexithymic
participants. Thus, alexithymic individuals do not benefit from
training in visual emotional features to such an extent that they
can equal the performance of non-alexithymics’.
To extend studies on visual emotional processing, we included
an auditory emotional task: judging the emotional tone of spoken
language i.e. prosody. This emotional prosody task previously
indicated deficits in Klinefelter [47] and schizophrenia [48]
patients. The current study is, as far as we know, the first to
examine affective prosody in alexithymia. Sentences had an
emotional semantic content and were spoken with an incongruent
prosody. Alexithymic individuals did not demonstrate problems
with recognizing emotional content nor prosody. It thus seems that
alexithymia is not specifically an emotional language-related
problem. Lane et al. [43] suggested that in alexithymia emotional
experience is blunted or absent in contrast to aprosodic individuals
who experience emotions fully. Thus, these two disorders rely on
different mechanisms.
On a more cognitive-emotional level high alexithymics were not
impaired on associative emotional learning nor on identity
learning. This is in disagreement with the notion that they have
difficulties coupling words to emotional states [19]. It thus appears
that the task does not correlate well with the verbalizing scale of
the BVAQ. Possibly, this is the case because verbalizing requires
associating words with one’s own emotions whereas for this task
words had to be associated with external images of facial
expressions. Regarding any negative findings, it should be noted
that neurophysiological differences may nevertheless be present.
Specifically, Vermeulen et al. [49] found no effects of alexithymia
on perception of emotional expressions, despite delayed neuro-
physiologic responses. Furthermore, the generalizability of this
study is limited by the fact that only healthy university students
participated, who on average function at a high level. Studies on
people with very high levels of alexithymia, e.g. patients with
psychosomatic complaints, may present different results.
A clinical implication of our findings might be that training or
therapy focused on awareness, recognition and regulation of
emotions might be beneficial for individuals with alexithymia.
Greenberg [50] proposed one such approach, named ‘‘emotion-
focused therapy’’. In this approach, patients are taught how to
become aware of their emotions, to understand their bodily
reactions, and to express emotion in a context appropriate way.
Although not specifically designed for alexithymic individuals, it
could be tailored to each individual [50].
In sum, questionnaires indicated that participants scoring high
on the cognitive component of alexithymia are characterized by
suppressive rather than reappraisal strategies. In addition,
alexithymic individuals showed specific deficits in emotional
processing. Alexithymic individuals were impaired on recognition
of briefly presented emotional expressions and on emotional
mentalizing. No deficits were seen in processing of emotional
language nor in associating words to emotional faces. This implies
that the interaction of language and emotions might not be at the
core of alexithymia. Future studies are necessary to explore the
specific emotion processing difficulties in alexithymia. The use of
brain imaging may help unravel brain mechanisms underlying
emotional processing deficits in alexithymia. For example, Aleman
[19] suggested that compromised interactive processing in
hippocampal–amygdala circuits during emotional relational mem-
ory could underlie the verbalizing problems in alexithymia.
Neuroimaging techniques and appropriate data analysis methods
may enable us to shed more light on brain structures that are
implicated in alexithymia.
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